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Use of low-noise detectors can both increase the secret bit rate of long-distance quantum key 
distribution (QKD) and dramatically extend the length of a fibre optic link over which secure 
key can be distributed.  Previous work has demonstrated use of ultra-low-noise transition-
edge sensors (TESs) in a QKD system with transmission over 50 km.  In this work, we 
demonstrate the potential of the TESs by successfully generating error-corrected, privacy-
amplified key over 148.7 km of dark optical fibre at a mean photon number μ = 0.1, or 184.6 
km of dark optical fibre at a mean photon number of 0.5. We have also exchanged secret key 
over 67.5 km that is secure against powerful photon-number-splitting attacks.  
 
 Many classical encryption schemes base their security on the perceived difficulty of efficiently performing 
certain computational tasks, such as the factoring of large numbers.  Quantum key distribution (QKD), on the 
other hand, allows two users to create a shared, secret, random key for encrypting data, enabling communication 
that can be proven secure by the laws of physics [1]. Ideally, information is contained in the state of a single 
quantum, so an eavesdropper (“Eve”) is unable to gain information without disturbing the system and revealing 
her actions. To implement QKD, it is necessary to have a source of single quanta, a method for encoding and 
decoding information onto and from these quanta, and a protocol for establishing a key. Photons are the obvious 
choice for sending information over large distances with little decoherence or loss. At present, there are no 
commercially-available single photon sources, but a heavily attenuated, pulsed laser source provides a practical 
alternative. Photon statistics from such a laser source follow a Poisson distribution, where the probability of a 
multi-photon signal is approximately μ2/2 for mean photon number μ < 1. The presence of these signals must be 
included in the secrecy analysis of the system, because an eavesdropper could gain information about multi-
photon signals without being detected. Hypothetically, in the presence of channel loss an eavesdropper using a 
sophisticated (but presently unfeasible) photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [2] could even gain complete 
knowledge of the key if the mean photon number, μ, exceeds a certain link-loss and therefore distance-dependent 
maximum value. Such upper limits on μ set a maximum QKD secret key transmission distance owing to the 
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reduction in signal-to-noise with distance.  In this paper we show that maximum secret key transmission distances 
and rates can be dramatically extended by the use of ultra low-noise transition-edge sensor (TES) single-photon 
detectors in a novel optical fibre QKD system.  
Long-distance fibre-based QKD systems such as the one described in this work usually use phase-encoding. 
In the “prepare-and-measure” BB84 QKD protocol [3], the sender (Alice) encodes a random bit onto a photon 
using one of two randomly chosen conjugate bases, and sends it to the receiver (Bob). Bob then performs a 
measurement on the photon, randomly choosing one of the two possible bases. Their random basis choices are 
then shared over a public channel and only events where the same bases were used are retained, thereby creating a 
sifted key. Error correction [4] and privacy amplification [5] are applied to the sifted key to create a shorter, final 
secret key.  
Fibre-based QKD systems usually operate at one of the telecommunications wavelengths where optical fibre 
has very low loss. Fibre has minimum loss of ~ 0.2 dB/km at 1550 nm, but detector properties play a critical role 
in the performance of QKD systems and limit the length of a secure link. Most present-day optical fibre QKD 
systems use InGaAs/InP avalanche photo-diode (APD) detectors operated in Geiger mode, which have excellent 
timing resolution (<100 ps), but suffer from low efficiencies (~ 20%), usually have large dark-count rates (tens of 
kHz) and require long dead times (several tens of μs) following photon detection [6], limiting maximum 
transmission distances to approximately 100 km. In contrast, the TES detectors used in this work [7], can be 
engineered to have much higher detection efficiency at the target wavelength [8], with much shorter dead-time 
and have no dark counts, although ambient blackbody radiation creates a background count rate that plays the 
same ultimate role in a QKD system. Despite present TES timing resolutions of order 100 ns, the high efficiency, 
low dark count rates, and shorter dead-time of TESs mean that their incorporation in a QKD system can enable 
key distribution over longer distances, at higher secret bit rates and with higher security. TESs have previously 
been integrated into a QKD system yielding secret key transmission over 50 km of low-dispersion fibre, and 
many of the associated experimental details have been discussed [9]. The TESs used in the present work had 
detection efficiency of 65% at 1550 nm, background count rate of 10 counts per second dominated by blackbody 
radiation, timing resolution of 90 ns full-width at half-maximum, and dead time of 4 μs.  
A simplified schematic of the phase-encoding QKD system is shown in figure 1 and has been discussed in 
detail in Ref. 10. The system operates at a clock rate of 1 MHz with a single 10 MHz rubidium clock providing 
synchronization for Alice and Bob.† A distributed feedback laser, operating at a wavelength of 1550 nm, is gain-
switched to output pulses of width 100 ps.  After passing through Alice's phase encoder, which time-multiplexes 
the signals onto one fibre, the optical signals are attenuated to the single-photon level and coupled into a spool of 
202 km of single-mode fibre linked to Bob’s phase decoder, which, together with Alice’s encoder, comprises a 
single Mach-Zehnder interferometer.  The mean photon number μ of the system is defined as twice the mean 
photon number of the part of the photon wavepacket that transits the long path of Alice's interferometer, at the 
point that it leaves her enclave. Alice and Bob encode information and choose measurement bases by applying 
phases to the photons appropriate for the BB84 protocol [11] using their respective fast electro-optic phase 
modulators, which are located external to their interferometers [12] for stability. Alice only modulates the phase 
of the part of the wavepacket that travels through the long path in her phase encoder, while Bob modulates the 
phase of the part that took her short path. BB84 data is communicated in Bob’s detections of photons that take the 
interfering long-short or short-long paths. Typically in such phase-encoded systems, roughly one half of the 
transmitted signals yield no information, owing to photons that are either delayed or advanced by several ns 
relative to the data photons, corresponding to the long-short time difference between the paths in the encoder and 
decoder. This would create a problem for detectors, such as the TES, that lack sufficient timing resolution to 
discriminate between the different arrival times. So, our system uses a novel switching technique at the input of 
Bob's interferometer to eliminate these amplitudes: the photon amplitude for Alice’s short (long) path is switched 
onto Bob’s long (short) path, respectively.  This allows the TESs to be used in the system and doubles the 
implementation efficiency of a phase encoded system 
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Figure 1: Simplified schematic of phase-coding QKD system.  LP = linear polarizer; VOA = variable 
optical attenuator; PBS = polarizing beam splitter; DFB = distributed feedback laser. 
 
By inserting a 290-ns fibre delay into one of the output ports of Bob's phase decoder, and rotating its 
polarization by 90°, both outputs are time-multiplexed onto a single optical fibre using a polarizing fibre splitter, 
allowing the receiver to operate with only one TES detector.  A histogram of arrival times at the receiver relative 
to the 1 MHz clock signal displays two peaks, one of which contains events from “0” bits and the other which 
contains “1” bits after sifting [9]. The peaks are each 90 ns full-width-at-half-maximum and are spaced 290 ns 
apart. To define the sifted key bits, it is necessary to choose appropriate timing windows for the 0 bits and the 1 
bits.  Wide timing windows would encompass most of the counts in each channel, maximizing the sifted bit rate, 
                                                                                                                                                                         
† Single-clock synchronization is infeasible in a practical setting outside a laboratory, and a system is under development that uses independent clocks at 
Alice and Bob. 
but would also include many background counts, leading to a higher sifted bit error rate (BER).  Narrower timing 
windows would contain fewer background counts, reducing the sifted BER, but would also reduce the sifted bit 
rate.  We chose a width of the timing window to maximize the secret bit rate of the system; this optimal width 
depends on the rate of real counts compared to the rate of background counts [10].  In general, the optimal 
window width, which ranged from 30 ns to 170 ns, was narrower for longer distances or lower mean photon 
numbers.  
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Figure 2: Sifted bit rate and bit error rate as a function of distance at a mean photon number of μ = 0.1 for 
optimal window widths. Distances shorter than 202 km were achieved by defining the first part of the fibre 
link to be within the transmitter’s enclave, as discussed in the text. 
 
Although the length of the fibre link is fixed at 202 km, shorter effective distances can be realized by 
redefining Alice's transmitter to contain some first portion of the 202 km optical fibre, which acts as an extra 
attenuator. The mean photon number μ of signals leaving Alice’s enclave must then include the loss in this length 
of fibre. For example, consider transmissions with μ202 = 0.5 at the input to the full 202 km of fibre. Redefining 
the system so that Alice includes the first 35.8 km of optical fibre, the transmission distance becomes 166.2 km, 
and we find that μ = 0.1 at the output of the "new" Alice, where we have used the measured attenuation of α = 
0.195 dB/km for the optical fibre.  In general, the relation between effective transmission distance, deff, and mean 
photon number μ is 
  0 10 202(10 / ) log ( / )effd d α μ μ= + ,(1) 
where d0 = 202 km.  Note that we have only used this technique to map the 202 km fibre link to shorter distances; 
mapping to longer distances would be nontrivial because of effects such as fibre dispersion. In figure 2 we show 
the sifted bit rate and sifted BER as a function of transmission distance for detection windows optimizing the 
secret bit rate.  The sifted bit rate is consistent with the measured fibre loss, detector efficiency, and window 
widths, allowing for 7.98 dB loss within Bob’s interferometer and optics.  The dependence of the BER on window 
width (not shown) is consistent with the measured background count rate, and from the variation with window 
width, we infer that the portion of the BER that is solely due to interferometer visibility is 1.8%. 
        Figure 3 shows the secret bit rate as a function of effective transmission distance of the system, after error 
correction of the sifted key using the CASCADE algorithm [4], and “BBBSS91” privacy amplification [13] as 
implemented in Reference [14].  It is assumed that: the Alice-Bob quantum channel losses are random photon 
deletions with probability corresponding to the measured fibre attenuation; all sifted bits arising from multi-
photon signals leaving Alice’s enclave are known to Eve; all sifted bit errors are attributed to Eve having 
performed intercept-resend attacks in the Briedbart basis [13] on single-photon signals in the sifted key; and 
publicly communicated parity bits for error correction are known to Eve [15]. To facilitate comparison of our 
results with those of other groups, we have displayed our data at the canonical μ = 0.1 value [13]. We report a 
new record maximum QKD transmission distance of 148.7 km at this photon number. From a total of 5644 sifted 
bits we produced 1307 secret bits at a rate of 1.36 secret bit per second (b.p.s) at this distance. However, the 
choice of μ = 0.1 is arbitrary. Operation at higher μ yields a higher sifted bit rate and lower sifted BER, but 
requires more privacy amplification because of the increased likelihood of multi-photon events: for each 
transmission distance there is an optimal μ for which the secret bit rate is maximized. In general, it is unlikely for 
a given system that this optimal μ is 0.1. If we use equation (1) to map the μ = 0.1 data to a higher μ, the effective 
transmission distance becomes longer, shifting the μ = 0.1 curve in figure 3 to the right. However, the increased 
privacy amplification necessary at higher μ also shifts the curve down, until the secret bit rate for the data point 
furthest to the right crosses zero.  At this point we have reached the maximum transmission distance of our system 
with BBBSS91 privacy amplification.  For our data, the cutoff occurs just over μ = 0.5 and yields a maximum 
transmission distance of 184.6 km. 
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Figure 3: Secret bit rate as a function of transmission distance, analyzed at μ = 0.1 and at μ = 0.5. 
 
In the adversarial context of QKD the random-deletion channel assumption of BBBSS91 privacy 
amplification cannot be rigorously justified with the simple BB84 protocol. For instance, in a PNS attack Eve 
could hypothetically: block all the single photon signals; remove one photon from each multi-photon signal and 
store it in a quantum memory; and send the remaining photons from each multi-photon signal over a loss-free 
channel, to keep Bob’s signal detection rate unchanged.  Once the bases are announced, Eve could measure her 
stored photons and gain complete knowledge of the key. Within the simple BB84 protocol, protection against 
PNS attacks requires operation at mean photon numbers low enough to ensure that at least some of the sifted bits 
arise from single-photon signals. From 13350 sifted bits with a bit error rate of 5.3%, we have generated secret 
key secure against general [16] PNS attacks over a 67.5 km fibre link at μ = 0.0041, under the conservative 
assumption that all of Bob’s losses are accessible to Eve. 
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Figure 4: Secret bit rate as a function of distance for data secure against general photon number splitting 
attacks.   
 
Using ultra-low noise, high-efficiency TES detectors in a novel optical fibre QKD system at 1550 nm we 
have set several new secret key transmission distance records. To the best of our knowledge, at the time this paper 
was written the distance record for secret key creation in a system with μ = 0.1 was 122 km [17]‡.  We have now 
increased this record distance by 22% to 148.7 km. The previous record distance for key creation using weak laser 
pulse QKD with the simple BB84 protocol secure against individual PNS attacks was 50.6 km [19]. We have 
increased this record distance by more than 30%, and also surpassed by several km the maximum PNS-secure 
transmission distance inferred in a recent “decoy state” protocol implementation with conventional detectors [20].  
Our demonstration of secret key production at 184.6 km at μ = 0.5 under the assumption of a random deletion 
channel is a new, absolute distance record for QKD. This result indicates that PNS-secure QKD could be 
extended well into the > 100 km transmission distance regime using TES detectors with a decoy state protocol: 
the decoy states would provide rigorous justification for the channel properties, without additional assumptions. 
We observe that our new methodology of using a detection time-window selected to maximize the secret bit rate 
is likely to be of great value in optimizing the performance of other QKD systems. Finally, we note that 
significant reductions in TES timing jitter and dead-time are feasible with fairly straightforward improvements in 
the detector electronics, potentially opening the door to higher secret bit rates over the long transmission distances 
demonstrated here. 
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‡ Another group has achieved single-photon interference with >80% visibility over a link of 150 km, but their system, which transmitted at μ = 0.2 and did 
not include phase modulators, was not used to create secret key [18]. 
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